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Abstract
 Given the changes in the connotations of the term “terrorism” since the infamous September 
11 attacks, this article seeks to understand terrorism through the framework of international and 
domestic laws. In addition, the article highlights the experiences of South Korea, which has for 
years avoided military confrontation while responding to state-sponsored terrorism originating in 
North Korea. The article considers the history of terrorist acts experienced by South Korea and 
discusses the rejection of some comprehensive anti-terrorism laws due to violation of civil rights. 
Furthermore, the article details the frameworks, associated issues of 13 international anti-terrorism 
conventions, the overview of problems that have arisen in relation to penalties for terrorists and 
other issues in South Korea’s domestic Penal Code. Having entered into a number of international 
conventions, South Korea has basically consolidated its domestic legal system, but it is clear that it 
has been unable to sufficiently avoid the problems inherent in the international system of anti-
terrorism conventions.
Anti-terrorist Measures in South Korean Domestic Law as
Viewed from the Framework of International Law
Hae Kyung KIM*
Ⅰ.  Preface
 The image conjured by the word “terrorism” has changed significantly since September 11, 
20011.  However, there is some danger involved in interpreting this situation in accord with a 
politics that responds “realistically.” As a legal scholar, the author of the present paper is 
particularly strongly aware of the necessity of considering the situation within a legal framework.
 In addition, my own personal background as a citizen of South Korea makes me sensitive 
to arguments, which have increased in stridency since September 11, that are easily permissive 
  * Assistant Professor, School of Law, Meiji University
  1 My own opinions regarding the definition of terrorism cannot be related here due to limitations of space. 
This paper will proceed based on a concept of terrorism as “acts committed by certain groups based on 
specific beliefs or ideologies in order to generate fear in societies, in particular through harming or 
threatening individuals related to or belonging to a particular nation or international organization, as a 
means of imposing those beliefs or ideologies on that nation or international organization.”
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of extreme measures such as military actions.  South Korea, in the context of its relationship 
with its neighbor North Korea, has experienced constant acts of terrorism targeting government 
dignitaries and commercial aircraft.  Given that to date South Korea has never gone to war in 
response to these incidents, a certain value may be seen in opposing this fact to the present 
tendency to assume military measures as the appropriate response to terrorism.  The fact that 
since the September 11 attacks, South Korea, in the context of its alliance with the U.S., has 
become involved in wars and is confronting new terrorist threats, is also suggestive from a 
number of perspectives.
 The purpose of this paper is to deepen legal arguments in relation to terrorism, with two 
perspectives as the major focus.  The first of these is a consideration of how measures in response 
to terrorism are being instituted within domestic law, which follows the framework of 
international law.  The second is a consideration of the type of legal system South Korea has 
established in order to resist terrorism that is international in scope.  In an attempt to shed light 
on these issues, the paper will be structured as follows.  First, I will consider the history of 
terrorism in South Korea since the nation’s foundation, and summarize South Korea’s responses.
 Before commencing my discussion, I would like to review the status of previous research 
concerning South Korea’s legal responses to terrorism.  Given the nation’s history, a review of 
South Korean resources reveals a considerable degree of interest in the subject of terrorism, but 
despite this the tendency has been to focus on specific incidents and related laws.  Previous 
research tends to be limited to 1) discussions that provide an overview of terrorism; 2) discussions 
of terrorist methods; 3) discussions limited to individual international conventions or specific 
subjects of conventions, such as Kim (2007)2 concerning terrorism targeting aircraft; 4) 
collections of data published by the National Intelligence Service, the Korean National Police 
Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, etc.; and 5) introductions to terrorist 
organizations.  No previous research treats domestic law within the international legal system 
developed to combat terrorism. This paper will therefore represent the first research to 
comprehensively take up the relationship between international law and South Korean domestic 
law related to terrorism.
Ⅱ.　South Korea’s Experience of Terrorism
( 1 )　North Korean state-supported terrorism
 During the Cold War, South Korea was frequently subject to hijackings carried out by 
North Korea.  First, in an incident in February 1958, an aircraft belonging to Korean National 
Airlines, the forerunner of Korean Air, was hijacked by North Korean agents and landed in 
North Korea.  In the Korean Air YS-11 hijacking incident in December 1969, North Korean 
agents hijacked a Korean Air aircraft and landed it in North Korea.
 North Korean terrorism began to take on a more international character with the Rangoon 
incident in October 1983, in which bombs were concealed in Myanmar’s Martyr’s Mausoleum 
commemorating Aung San, in an attempt to assassinate South Korean Prime Minister Chun 
Doo-hwan and his party.  The government party were conducting a goodwill visit to Myanmar 
2　 Kim, Han-Taek, “T’erŏrijŭmgwa kukchepŏp” [Terrorism and International Law], (Seoul: Chiin Books, 
2007).
Anti-terrorist Measures in South Korean Domestic Law as Viewed from the Framework of International Law　　3
in order to enlist support for the Seoul Olympics, and were scheduled to visit the grave of Aung 
San, considered the father of the country, as one of the stops on their diplomatic itinerary. 
However, bombs concealed in the roof of the mausoleum exploded, killing 17 members of the 
South Korean contingent; the deputy prime minister and the foreign minister were among four 
cabinet members killed by the blast.  Four Myanmarese nationals were also killed, and 47 people 
were injured.  A subsequent investigation by the government of Myanmar showed that the 
incident had been the work of North Korean operatives, and the nation severed diplomatic 
relations with North Korea.  In September 1986, a similar incident occurred at Seoul’s Gimpo 
International Airport, where a concealed bomb killed five people while Seoul was playing host 
to the Asian Games.  On November 29, 1987, the Korean Airlines Bombing Incident occurred. 
In this incident, Korean Airlines Flight 858, enroute from Baghdad to Seoul via Abu Dhabi and 
Bangkok, was blown up in mid-air by a bomb planted by North Korean operatives.  All 115 
passengers and crew were lost without a trace.  One of the North Koreans involved, Kim Hyon-
hui, offered testimony concerning the incident, but as in the case of the Rangoon Incident, the 
North Korean government denied its involvement.
( 2 )　Terrorism in nations subject to international military actions since the 9.11 attacks
 Since the 9.11 attacks, South Korea has participated in a variety of capacities in the “war 
on terror” being conducted chiefly by the U.S. and the UK, including through the dispatch of 
troops.  Concomitant with this has been the involvement of South Korean nationals in a number 
of terrorist incidents.  On June 17, 2004, Kim Sun-il, an interpreter working for an equipment 
supply company, was kidnapped in Iraq.  The South Korean government rejected demands 
issued on June 21 by the armed group responsible for the kidnapping that it should withdraw all 
of its military personnel in Iraq within 24 hours and terminate its planned additional dispatch of 
3,000 troops.  The following day, Kim was killed.  The brutal nature of this murder – Kim was 
decapitated – and the fact that footage of the killing reached the Internet, ensured that the 
incident received widespread attention.  On July 19, 2007, 20 members of the Saemmul 
Presbyterian Church sent to provide medical and educational services, and three members of a 
South Korean NGO who joined them in northern Afghanistan, were kidnapped in an incident 
which resulted later in the deaths of two of the victims.  During negotiations, the kidnappers not 
only requested the release of prisoners being held by the government of Afghanistan, but, as in 
the case of the kidnapping of Kim Sun-il discussed above, demanded the complete withdrawal 
of South Korean military personnel from the country.  This incident made it clear that there is 
some connection between the activities of the South Korean military and terrorist acts.
 Cases of this type, in which demands are made on the country of origin of the victims of 
kidnapping to withdraw its troops, are not limited to South Korea.  Japan, another East Asian 
nation involved in the war on terror, has experienced incidents of this type twice in Iraq and once 
in Pakistan, and in fact such cases are becoming universal, as can be seen in the kidnapping of 
journalists from various other nations.  In the case of acts of terrorism conducted by North 
Korea, South Korea was able to take action as an individual nation.  However, because cases 
similar to those discussed above arise in the context of international military actions, and further, 
because the expression of a clear position (refusal to withdraw) rather than negotiation is 
demanded in these cases, many situations have arisen in which it is difficult to avoid harm to 
ordinary citizens.
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Ⅲ.　The Necessity for International Law, as Seen in the Review Process 
　　 for South Korea’s Comprehensive Anti-terrorist Laws
 Following the 9.11 attacks, South Korea judged that it would be difficult for the nation to 
respond efficiently to a terrorist incident under the nation’s existing anti-terrorist guidelines.  At 
this time, the soccer World Cup, to be held in Japan and South Korea, was also approaching.  In 
2001, the nation formulated new draft anti-terrorist legislation, and advance notice was given in 
the National Intelligence Service announcement 2001-1.  However, despite the fact that the 
legislation passed the Standing Parliamentary Information Committee in the final sitting of the 
16th National Assembly, the National Human Rights Commission of the Republic of Korea 
announced that the law potentially opened the way to violations of human rights.  Subsequent 
protests by citizens’ groups resulted in the law exceeding the deadline for the process of review 
by the Judiciary Committee, and the legislation was scrapped3. However, the Ministry of 
Government Legislation (the government agency supervising the formulation of legislation) 
selected the draft for reconsideration during the 17th National Assembly, and presented a report 
concerning the legislation to then-President Roh Moo-hyun.  Further impetus was provided by 
the killing of Kim Sun-il in Iraq, and on June 27, 2004, An Yeong Keun, the chairperson of the 
1st Policy Coordination Committee of the Yeollin Uri Party, the ruling party at the time, indicated 
that the necessity for the legislation was increasing and that it had already been reviewed within 
the party.  An announced the party’s agreement with the act, stating that the present situation was 
equivalent to the effective suspension of the foreign intelligence-gathering function of the 
National Intelligence Service.
 In August 2005, the government and the Yeollin Uri Party submitted a revised anti-terrorism 
legislation to parliament (formally known as the Law concerning the Prevention of Terrorism 
and the Compensation of Damages, etc.).  Under the new legislation, an Anti-terrorism 
Committee chaired by the Prime Minister would be established directly under the jurisdiction of 
the President, an Anti-terrorism Center responsible for the investigation and prevention of 
terrorism would be established under the aegis of this committee, and the director of the National 
Intelligence Service would be made the head of the Center.
 The revised anti-terrorism legislation restricted the granting of police authority to personnel 
of the Anti-terrorism Center.  Following the submission of this draft legislation, the legislative 
environment changed with the promulgation of three terrorism-related laws4, the Law concerning 
the Safety and Security of Aircraft, the Law concerning Measures to Protect Nuclear Facilities, 
etc. and to Prevent Radiation Disasters, and the Law concerning Penalties for Inflicting Damage 
upon Ships or Maritime Structures.
 The revised draft anti-terrorist legislation was made up of 15 articles and two supplementary 
provisions.  These can be broadly divided into eight topics and summarized as follows: 1) 
Definition of terrorism; 2) Establishment of National Anti-terrorism Council, Anti-terrorism 
  3 Kang, Tae-Chol, “T’erŏpangjibŏbanŭi ippŏpchŏk kŏmt’o” [An Examination of Terror Prevention 
Legislation], Han’gukt’erŏhakhoebo [The Korean Association for Terrorism Studies], 2.1 (2009).
  4 Son, Tong-Gwon, “Miguk tongsidabalt’erŏ ihu, chuyogukkaŭi taet’erŏ ippŏbe kwanhan koch’al” [Post 
9/11 America Counter Terrorism Legislation], Taet’erŏ yŏn’gu[Korea Research Institute on Terrorism], 26 
(2003): 71.
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Center, and anti-terrorist mechanisms; 3) Formulation of measures for the prevention of 
terrorism and the management of public safety; 4) Anti-terrorism measures for major national 
events; 5) Immigration restrictions for non-South Korean nationals; 6) Analysis of situation and 
responses; 7) Requisitioning of personnel for special anti-terrorist units and support for military; 
and 8) Establishment of penalties for false reports and granting of police authority to personnel 
of the Anti-terrorist Center.
 However, this revised draft was also rejected at the plenary session on the grounds that it 
potentially increased the powers of the National Intelligence Service.  The theoretical background 
for this judgment was provided by a position document published by the Korean Bar Association5. 
This document first indicated that because the definitions of terrorism, terrorist funding and 
terrorist organizations in the draft legislation were abstract, depending on the ways in which 
these definitions were applied, they could provide a basis for abuses of authority and violations 
of human rights.  The document further criticized the draft legislation from the perspective that 
the granting of authority to the National Intelligence Service, the nation’s information-gathering 
agency, for activities related to the prevention of terrorism and the mounting of responses to 
terrorism would introduce imbalances into the principle of checks and balances, and would 
increase the authority and the lack of transparency of the agency.
 Following the scrapping of the draft legislation, there was a change of administration in 
South Korea, and the Grand National Party took power.  Prior to this, the Grand National Party 
had twice submitted draft anti-terrorist legislation to the parliament (in March 2005 and February 
2006), but because it was an opposition party and the legislation did not receive widespread 
support, these drafts were also rejected.  In part stimulated by the kidnap of the Saemmul 
Presbyterian church missionaries in Afghanistan in July 2007 and the murder of two members 
of the group, the party, led by its most senior member, Gong Sung-jin, submitted a new draft 
legislation (formally entitled the Basic Law concerning National Anti-terrorist Activities) to 
parliament on October 28, 2008.  The gist of this draft legislation was the bifurcation of the 
system of response to terrorism, with the establishment of a standing committee under the Prime 
Minister’s Office to be responsible for anti-terrorism duties and an Anti-terrorism Center under 
the National Intelligence Service to oversee practical operations.  The draft legislation, made up 
of 30 articles, can be divided up as follows: 1) Purpose and definitions; 2) Responsibilities of 
national and regional governments; 3) Relationship with other laws; 4) Establishment of 
terrorism response plans; 5) Inspection and reporting; 6) Organization of response (policy- and 
intelligence-related); 7) Management of intelligence; 8) Issuing of terrorism warnings; 9) 
Designation and disbandment of terrorist organizations; 10) Anti-terrorist and public safety 
measures for major national events; 11) Elimination of causes of vulnerability to terrorism; 12) 
System for notification of and report on terrorist incidents; 13) Establishment and operation of 
special anti-terrorist units; 14) Provision of support for military strength; 15) Rewards; 16) 
Compensation for victims; 17) Promotion of education and research; 18) International 
cooperation; and 19) Appeals for assistance to relevant organizations.  However, this draft was 
resisted by citizens’ groups and by the legal sector, including the Korean Bar Association, and 
the administrative and local administrative sectors on the grounds that the establishment of an 
  5 Taehanbyŏnhosahyŏphoe [Korean Bar Association], “T’erŏbangjippŏpsujŏngane taehan ŭigyŏnsŏ” 
[Opinions on Revising Korean Counter-terrorism Laws] January 3, 2002.
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anti-terrorist center under the National Intelligence Service (an organization with an information-
gathering function) increased the organization’s authority excessively.  Subsequently, the draft 
bill was passed over.  On May 19, 2010, the Special Security Law, essentially the draft anti-
terrorism bill discussed above with its main details unchanged, was passed as an effective means 
of ensuring the safety and security of the G20 Leaders’ Summit, but despite this, as of April 2011 
there remains no clear prospect of the enactment of the bill.
 Gong Sung-jin and his supporters also submitted a draft law concerning the prevention of 
cyber-terrorism (formally entitled the National Cyber-danger Management Law) to parliament 
on the same day as the bill discussed above.  This draft legislation concentrated even more 
authority in the hands of the National Intelligence Service than the previous draft.  For example, 
Article 4 stipulated the establishment of a National Cyber-safety Center under the aegis of the 
National Intelligence Service, with the details of its organization and operation to be decided by 
the director of the NIS.  Article 6 provided the guidelines for a top-down system for the 
implementation of cyber-terrorism measures (President → Director of National Intelligence 
Service → National Cyber-safety Center), in which the director of the NIS would formulate 
comprehensive plans at the direction of the President.  This draft was even more strongly 
opposed by citizens’ groups and the legal sector than the anti-terrorist draft legislation that had 
been submitted at the same time.  In response to these objections, Gong Sung-jin indicated that 
there was no organization other than the National Intelligence Service that possessed the means 
to comprehensively monitor and manage information6.  Clearly, given the relationship between 
cyber-terrorism and information, by contrast with the case of normal terrorist activities, it is 
unavoidable that authority would be concentrated in the hands of the ministries and agencies 
that administer information.  However, inasmuch as the draft treats the Internet, which is 
intimately related to issues of privacy, it makes no specific mention of this subject, making the 
existence of a third-party agency essential for the management of privacy issues.
 It is necessary for all nations to keep pace with the formulation of international law, and 
nations throughout the world recognize to some extent their responsibility as members of the 
international community to speed up their own processes of enactment of legislation.  However, 
the concerns over the violation of human rights being expressed by the legal community and 
citizens’ groups have not been dispelled, it will be essential to proceed prudently, on the basis of 
more comprehensive discussion than has been the case to date, at the same time as recognizing 
the urgency of putting in place new forms of anti-terrorist measures.
 In the case of South Korea, however, the variable of the nation’s relationship with North 
Korea must always simultaneously be taken into consideration.  Actions conducted by North 
Korea did not cease with the bombing of the Martyr’s Mausoleum or the aircraft bombing 
discussed above.  Since the 1990s, the following incidents have occurred: 1) On September 18, 
1996, a submarine that had carried North Korean operatives to South Korea ran aground near 
Gangneung.  A gun battle ensued with the South Korean army, resulting in the deaths of 24 
North Korean agents and, on the South Korean side, 11 soldiers, one police officer and one 
reservist, and four civilians; 2) On June 29, 2002, during the soccer World Cup and about two 
years after the June 2000 Inter-Korean Summit between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il, a clash 
  6 Gong, Sung-Jin (Korean Representative, Korean National Assembly Hall), in discussion with the author, 
August 25, 2009.
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occurred between North and South Korean patrol boats in the Yellow Sea, leaving four South 
Korean sailors dead and one missing; 3) On March 26, 2010, the South Korean naval patrol 
vessel Cheonan sank in the Yellow Sea following an explosion, with 46 sailors losing their lives. 
Tensions have certainly not eased between the two countries, with South Korea judging the 
2010 incident to be the result of a torpedo attack and the North denying this accusation; and 4) 
On November 23, 2010, the North Korean army suddenly bombarded Yeonpyeong Island, as a 
result, two marines and two civilians died.  Reflecting the situation between the two nations, the 
2006 South Korean Defense White Paper positioned North Korea as a “grave threat7,” and 
introduced measures in response to incursions into territorial waters or airspace.  However, 
whatever the nature of the government’s decisions, it is essential that they do not excessively 
violate the freedom and privacy of citizens.  There is a danger that this could engender a new 
disaffection with politics and social uncertainty, and thus benefit the terrorists themselves.
Ⅳ.　The Current Status of the System of Treaties related to International 
   Terrorism
( 1 )　Background to the adoption of treaties related to international terrorism
 As indicated by the above discussion, numerous problems exist with regard to anti-terrorist 
measures in domestic law, which are swayed by public opinion and easily influenced by the 
circumstances of specific administrations and major terrorist incidents.  Another important point 
is the fact that given the differences between countries in terms of legal systems and awareness 
of terrorism, the nature of the investigations launched by each of these countries will also differ. 
Today, there is no room for debate concerning the increasingly international character of 
terrorism, and it will be important to determine how to work in unison when incidents straddle 
borders.  A clearly defined scope of action will be necessary in order to achieve this goal.  Anti-
terrorism measures in international law can function as comprehensive guidelines in relation to 
these issues, and their meaning will only become greater in the future.  A country’s ratification 
of a convention announces the fact that that country is bound by the convention.  The ratification 
of anti-terrorism conventions and other important international conventions results in the 
modification of domestic law, and the ratification of such conventions also represents an 
agreement to create the conditions of possibility for international collaborative frameworks.
 Between the adoption of the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed 
on Board Aircraft in 1963 and the adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression 
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005, a total of 13 international terrorism-related conventions 
were adopted.
 However, while aiming towards global and universal regulation of terrorism, conventions 
of this type were formulated in response to the types and methods of terrorism that represented 
a threat at the time of their formulation, with none of them treating terrorism comprehensively 
or in its entirety.
 The 13 multilateral conventions concerning the regulation of terrorism can be classified 
into five categories and their characteristics summarized as follows.
 First, considering conventions dealing with the regulation of terrorism in the air, we have 
  7 Ministry of National Defense, Pangwibaeksŏ 2006 [Defense White Paper 2006 edition], (2007), 30-31.
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1) the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts committed On Board Aircraft, also 
known as the Tokyo Convention (adopted in Tokyo on September 14, 1963); 2) the Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, also known as the Hague Convention 
(adopted in the Hague on December 16, 1970); 3) the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, also known as the Montreal Convention 
(adopted in Montreal on September 23, 1971); and 4) the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, also known as the 
Montreal Protocol (adopted in Montreal on February 24, 1988).  The formulation of these 
conventions was necessitated by the fact that acts of terrorism against aircraft began to occur 
frequently from the 1950s, and these incidents very often crossed national borders.  The Hague 
Convention in particular marked a watershed in applying the “extradite or prosecute” principle, 
which would form part of all following terrorism-related conventions, to its signatories. 
However, the existence of states that provide support for terrorism and the frequency of suicide 
bombing today necessitate a new perspective on this principle.  Another major issue is the fact 
that in cases of hijacking there may be clashes between the jurisdiction of the country of 
registration of the aircraft, the country in which the aircraft is landed, the main country of 
business or country of habitual residence of the lessee, and the country of residence of the 
terrorists, and the order of precedence is unclear.
 Second, considering conventions that attempt to regulate terrorism against foreign 
diplomats or involving hostage-taking, we have 1) the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 
also known as the New York Convention (adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 
14, 1973); and 2) the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, also known as 
the Hostage Convention (adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 17, 1979).  While 
the New York Convention establishes conditions for the prosecution of terrorists by granting 
jurisdiction also to the country of origin of the victims, the problem remains that it does not 
establish an order of priority in cases in which a clash of jurisdictions occurs.  In addition, 
because the legal definition of terrorism is unclear, there has been unceasing argumentation 
concerning whether or not acts committed against internationally protected persons actually 
constitute terrorist acts.  The Hostage Convention incorporates considerations of human rights, 
enabling a nation requested to deliver up an individual accused of a terrorist act to refuse that 
request in the event that the prosecution results from the race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, 
or political beliefs of the individual in question.  However, the problem in practice is that 
consultations between the parties concerned take precedence in hostage-taking incidents, and 
these conventions are not applied in the case of actual terrorist acts (for example, the kidnappings 
discussed above).
 Third, looking at conventions regulating maritime terrorism, we have 1) the Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, also known as 
the Rome Convention (adopted in Rome on March 10, 1988); and 2) the Protocol for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf, 
also known as the Rome Protocol (adopted in Rome on March 10, 1988).  These conventions 
attempt to fill in the gaps in the conventions falling into the previous two categories, and 
incorporate successful elements and problematic points in relation to that aim.
 Fourth, taking conventions concerning terrorist methods into consideration, we have 1) the 
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Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (adopted in Vienna on March 3, 
1980); 2) the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection 
(adopted in Montreal on March 1, 1991); 3) the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings (adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 15, 1997); and 4) the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (adopted by the UN General 
Assembly on April 13, 2005).  These conventions reflect the fact that while a comprehensive 
definition of terrorism does not exist, new terrorist methods are emerging in rapid succession, 
and attempt to enable the prosecution of terrorists based on the methods used in the crime. 
However, given their nature, they present the problem of being unable to respond to new terrorist 
methods.
 Fifth, we have the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism (adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 9, 1999), currently the most 
comprehensive convention for the regulation of terrorist funding in its entirety.  Given that the 
definition of terrorism is unclear, this convention bases itself on the outcomes of previous 
international discussions in order to suppress terrorist financing itself.  However, the convention 
also incorporates the standard issues relating to jurisdiction and the extradition of perpetrators, 
and the ambiguity of the scope of the term “terrorist” creates the problem that what constitutes a 
criminal act will be defined arbitrarily by the parties to the convention.
( 2 )　Problems of international terrorism-related conventions
 The international community has pursued a sectoral approach in its response to the different 
forms of terrorism, adopting separate conventions for the regulation of terrorism in relation to 
different fields.  However, the texts of such conventions targeting individual fields are formulated 
and adopted on the basis of compromise between the conflicting interests of the parties to the 
agreement, and because of this, the types of problems discussed above are inherent in regulating 
and responding to terrorism on the basis of these separate conventions.  The major problems 
shared by the existing individual conventions can be elaborated as follows.
 First, there are limitations on the ability of the conventions to regulate terrorism because 
none of them are able to designate specific terrorist actions as international crimes.  Terrorism-
related conventions normally focus on criminal punishment by the courts of the parties to the 
agreement as the means of regulation of terrorism, and do not introduce the possibility of 
prosecution and punishment by the International Criminal Court.  In addition, while the majority 
of the conventions explicitly state the “extradite or prosecute” principle, they do not explicitly 
specify a duty of direct punishment of terrorist crimes, instead stipulating only a duty for each 
country to create the conditions of possibility for punishment on the basis of severe, or 
appropriate, criminal penalties.  This is interpreted as referring solely to a duty of domestic 
legislative measures, and in the absence of a clear duty of punishment, unified standards for 
punishment have not been established.
 The second problem common to the conventions is the fact that their effectiveness in 
regulating terrorist crimes is halved by the absence of explicit stipulations in regard to state 
terror and state-supported terrorist acts.  The third of the problems is the fact that in the case of 
terrorist acts committed by specified organizations or by individuals, while some states will 
view the act as clearly criminal, others will consider it a legitimate method for use by a national 
liberation movement, and no provisions enabling this conflict of opinion to be accurately judged 
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and resolved can be found in any of the existing individual conventions.  The fourth of the 
shared problems is the fact that existing individual conventions leave room for terrorism to be 
recognized as a political crime, and they do not explicitly state the fact that the principle of non-
extradition of political offenders does not apply.  The fifth shared problem that may be considered 
is the fact that the existing conventions do not offer any clear systemic framework enabling 
decisions on the order of precedence in cases in which a conflict of jurisdictions occurs.
Ⅴ.　Problems in Domestic Acceptance of International Terrorism-related 
   Conventions from the South Korean Perspective
( 1 )　Preconditions for acceptance in South Korean domestic law
 Because terrorist crimes normally have an international character, it is necessary for 
legislative measures to clarify their position in relationship to 1) the problem of conflicts in 
prosecutorial jurisdiction between the state that apprehends a criminal and nations with 
conflicting interests; 2) the problem of the principle of extradite or prosecute; and 3) the problem 
of assistance in criminal justice.  In order to resolve these problems, which are inherent to 
terrorist crimes, South Korea has to date joined the relevant international conventions and 
concluded bilateral conventions, and has fulfilled its obligations in relation to the domestic 
legislative measures stipulated by the international conventions.  By means of this process, 
South Korea has increased the severity of its penalties for terrorist crimes such as hijacking, has 
committed thoroughly to the principle of extradite or prosecute, has recognized the exception of 
the principle of non-extradition of political offenders, and has displayed cooperation with 
international frameworks such as those for the provision of assistance in criminal justice in the 
area of the investigation and prosecution of terrorist crimes.  However, the failure of the draft 
anti-terrorism legislation discussed above, despite the fact that, in relation to the criminal acts 
specified by the international conventions for the regulation of terrorism, such measures are 
necessary as the establishment of new penalties in domestic law and the establishment of 
prosecutorial jurisdiction in the case of extraterritorial crimes committed by non-nationals (one 
of the class of perpetrators specified by the conventions for which prosecutorial jurisdiction 
does not exist in current domestic law), leaves the nation in a situation in which adequate 
supplementation of the domestic legal framework via legislative measures is impossible.
( 2 )　Establishment of domestic prosecutorial jurisdiction
 Multilateral conventions for the regulation of international terrorism stipulate that the 
countries concerned in international terrorist acts take measures to assert jurisdiction.  “Countries 
concerned” here refers to the country in which the terrorist act took place (the territoriality 
principle), the country of nationality of the perpetrator or perpetrators (the active nationality 
principle), and the country of nationality of the victim or victims (the passive nationality 
principle).  Also falling within the scope of countries concerned are countries whose legal 
interests are violated by the crime (the protective principle) and countries which might not have 
a direct interest, but whose common legal interests, as presently recognized between states, are 
violated by the crime (the cosmopolitan principle8).
  8 With regard to the scope of local application of domestic penal codes, in principle domestic laws are 
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However, South Korea’s Penal Code stipulates provisions concerning the territoriality principle 
(Article 2, Article 4), the nationality principle (Article 3), and the protective principle (Article 5, 
Article 6), but not the cosmopolitan principle.  Given this, penalties can be applied under the 
South Korean penal code when South Korea is the site of a terrorist act, when a South Korean 
national is the perpetrator of a terrorist act, or when the rights of South Korean nationals or the 
nation’s legal interests are violated by a terrorist act.  However, problems arise when a terrorist 
act is committed extraterritorially by a non-national which violates the laws or the legal interests 
of a specific nation, and the perpetrator of the act escapes to and is apprehended in South Korea. 
In cases of this type, the tendency of international conventions is to take the various measures 
necessary to establish the jurisdiction (“supplementary jurisdiction”) of the country of residence 
of the perpetrator9.  However, in order to do so, legislative measures must be effected within 
domestic law, and South Korea’s Penal Code does not provide for punishment based on the 
cosmopolitan principle.  Giving consideration to the nature of contemporary terrorism, with the 
increasingly international character of incidents and frequent movements by perpetrators 
between their own countries and other countries, this represents a significant problem.
 In addition, terrorism-related conventions concluded since 1988, beginning with the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
(the Rome Convention) enable states to claim jurisdiction (“voluntary jurisdiction”) in the case 
of crimes committed by non-nationals making their habitual residence within the country. 
However, the South Korean Penal Code does not provide for punishment in relation to these 
instances10.
 In such cases, South Korea therefore does not possess prosecutorial jurisdiction, and even 
if prosecutors mount a case in the nation’s courts, the case might be dismissed based on Article 
327, Item 1 of the Law concerning Criminal Proceedings (concerning procedures when the 
court does not possess jurisdiction over the accused).  When the investigating authorities have 
pursued charges against this type of perpetrator, they have no choice but to abandon the case, 
having no authority of prosecution11.
 The lack of provisions for punishment for terrorist crimes based on the cosmopolitan 
principle can be pointed to as a deficiency in South Korea’s legislative system.  It will be 
necessary for South Korea to establish similar provisions, which announce the application of 
punishment based on the cosmopolitan principle, even in cases in which national interests are in 
no way involved.  The establishment of such provisions in itself would prevent the perpetrators 
of terrorist crimes overseas from entering the country to avoid punishment, and would provide 
applicable in cases in which the common interests of nations or of all humanity are affected, irrespective 
of where the crime was committed, the nationality of the offender or the legal affiliation of the victim.
  9 See Article 7(4) of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Article 
6(4) of the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Article 6(4) of the Rome Convention, 
etc.
10 See Article 7(2) of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Article 
6(2) of the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Article 6(2) of the Rome Convention, 
etc.
11 However, in the case of hijackings, even when committed extraterritorially by a non-national, if the 
offender is apprehended in South Korea, South Korea has prosecutorial jurisdiction under the terms of 
Article 3 of the Law concerning the Operational Safety of Aircraft; if the airplane is forced to make an 
emergency landing in South Korea, South Korea has prosecutorial jurisdiction under the principle of 
continuing crime.
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a guarantee of the application of the provisions of the various international laws related to 
terrorism.
 Another issue can be indicated in relation to domestic prosecutorial jurisdiction.  Article 
6.1 of the Rome Convention enjoins the parties to the convention to “take such measures as may 
be necessary to establish its jurisdiction” (“necessary jurisdiction”) in regard to acts committed 
“against or on board a ship flying the flag of the State at the time the offense is committed.” 
However, here also South Korea requires a separately executed law that establishes jurisdiction 
in relation to crimes committed on or against ships flying the South Korean flag.  At present, in 
relation to this, Article 4 of the Penal Code states that the laws contained within are applicable 
to offenses committed extraterritorially by non-nationals against South Korean ships or aircraft. 
In other words, South Korea’s prosecutorial jurisdiction in relation to offenses committed on 
ships flying the South Korean flag is acknowledged by this provision.
( 3 )　Problems related to extradition of perpetrators
 South Korea is a signatory to numerous multilateral conventions that incorporate extradition 
provisions, and has also concluded bilateral conventions concerning extradition with 25 nations. 
However, this figure cannot be claimed to be high in comparison to European countries which 
have extradition agreements with more than 100 other countries.  In addition to the nation’s 
efforts to join these international conventions and conclude individual conventions, on August 
5, 1988, South Korea promulgated an extradition law which provided for domestic enforcement 
of any extradition conventions concluded with other countries in future, and that made it 
possible, if an extradition request was received from a concerned country with which South 
Korea was not bound in a convention, to grant the request as an act of international cooperation 
if a guarantee was received that the country would grant an extradition request from South 
Korea in relation to the same type of crime in future.  This law provides detailed stipulations in 
regard to crimes subject to extradition, reasons for refusal of extradition, extradition procedures, 
and procedures for requesting extradition from another country.
 Article 8(1) of this law stipulates that if the crime for which extradition is requested is an 
offense of a political nature or a related offense, extradition will not proceed, giving expression 
to the necessary principle of non-extradition in the case of political offenses.  In addition, Article 
9(5) of the law stipulates that extradition may be refused when the nature of the offense for 
which extradition is sought and the environment in which the extradited prisoner will be placed 
are taken into consideration and extradition is judged to be inhumane, displaying a legislative 
stance in accord with recent global tendencies.  Article 8(1) also sets out exceptions to the 
principle of non-extradition in the case of political offenses.  However, it also stipulates that this 
will not apply if the offense corresponds to the following offenses defined by other clauses: An 
offense against the life or person of a head of state/leader of government or that individual’s 
family (Article 8(1):1; an offense for which South Korea has jurisdiction over the offender or 
one for which the nation has an obligation of extradition, as specified by a multilateral convention 
(Article 8(1):2; an offense against the lives or persons of large numbers of people (Article 8(1):3; 
or a minor offense for which the term of imprisonment is less than one year, as defined in Article 
6.  Of these, the offenses defined in Article 8(1):1 and Article 8(1):3 are types frequently 
observed in terrorist acts in the form of assassinations of political officials and acts of 
indiscriminate mass murder.  This is to say that the stipulations of South Korea’s extradition law 
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also apply indirectly to terrorist acts.
 The offenses defined by Article 8(1):2 of the law are, by contrast, directly related to terrorist 
acts.  The reason for this is that South Korea has become a signatory to numerous multilateral 
conventions for the regulation of terrorism, and has established regulations enabling the extradite 
or prosecute principle to be applied to the offenses defined by these conventions.  From the 
perspective of its relations with the other members of these conventions, it is essential for South 
Korea to observe the stipulations of the conventions.  However, problems arise in relation to the 
perpetrators of terrorist acts covered by international conventions to which South Korea is not a 
party.  For example, South Korea became a member of the Rome Convention (established March 
10, 1988) on May 13, 2003.  However, prior to this, in the event that non-nationals had committed 
a politically motivated terrorist act on the ocean outside South Korean territorial waters and had 
subsequently fled to South Korea, the nation, having stipulated no punishments based on the 
cosmopolitan principle, would have had no prosecutorial jurisdiction over the offenders, and, 
under the terms of Article 8(1):2 of its extradition law would have had no obligation to extradite 
the offenders.  In such a case, unless the offense corresponded to one of those for which an 
obligation of extradition is defined in Article 8(1):1 and 8(1):3 of the extradition law, the 
perpetrators would ultimately have escaped prosecution based on the principle of non-extradition 
of political offenders.  This type of contradiction was inherent in the existing extradition law.  In 
order to correct this situation, it was necessary as a priority to establish explicit provisions 
concerning exceptions to the principle of non-extradition in the case of terrorist acts.  The 
extradition law was therefore revised on December 14, 2005, and Article 8(2) now stipulates 
that an offender will not be extradited in the event that the request for extradition is made for the 
purpose of prosecuting another crime of a political nature or executing an already existing 
sentence for another offense.
 However, as indicated above, together with this it will be necessary for South Korea to 
establish provisions in the Penal Code for the application of penalties for terrorist crimes on the 
basis of the cosmopolitan principle, even if they do not affect the nation itself.  The establishment 
of such provisions would enable South Korea to make its own choices and decisions in relation 
to penalties for terrorist offenders and their extradition or non-extradition.  This would also 
make it possible for South Korea to protect political offenders by choosing not to extradite to the 
country in which their offense was committed, and, by clearly expressing the will to establish 
penalties based on the cosmopolitan principle for inhuman terrorist crimes, the nation would 
present itself on the world stage as a defender of human rights.  This legislation would also 
enable South Korea to push ahead with the conclusion of bilateral extradition conventions, an 
area in which it lags behind European nations.
( 4 )　Problems related to prosecution and penalties
 The international conventions for the regulation of terrorism apply the extradite or prosecute 
principle in relation to offenders defined by the specific convention to the country of residence 
of the offender.  Accordingly, if the nation of residence of the offender is not the victim of the 
offense, the nation will in most cases extradite the offender to a nation seeking extradition (in 
particular to the nation that was the victim of the offense).  In the event that the nation of 
residence of the offender is also the victim of the offense, it is regarded as normal for the 
offender not to be extradited to another nation, but to be prosecuted and penalized by the courts 
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of that nation itself.  When an offender is not extradited but prosecuted and penalized in the 
nation of residence itself, international terrorism-related conventions demand that the nation 
should exercise its prosecutorial jurisdiction as normal, and to apply penalties as would be the 
case for an ordinary crime of a very serious nature.
 South Korea is a party to international conventions that attempt to regulate hijackings.  In 
relation to hijackings as defined in the conventions to which the nation is a party, South Korea 
is therefore obliged to respect the extradite or prosecute principle, and also the principle of 
application of severe penalties when an offender is prosecuted and penalized without being 
extradited.  Based on its obligation to establish domestic legislative measures to provide for 
penalties for the acts of hijacking stipulated by the conventions, the nation established the Law 
concerning the Operational Safety of Aircraft on December 26, 1974.  This law accords with the 
general purpose of the international conventions in newly establishing specific provisions for 
the crime of hijacking (Article 8), the crime of killing or injuring hostages (Article 9), the crime 
of plotting a hijack (Article 10), the crime of interfering with the operation of an aircraft (Article 
11), and the crime of bringing dangerous articles on board an aircraft (Article 12).
 The particularly noteworthy feature of this law is that the crimes to which it is applicable, 
as stipulated in Article 3, correspond exactly to those stipulated in Article 1 of the Tokyo 
Convention (in the terms of the Tokyo Convention, (a) offenses against penal law; and (b) acts 
which, whether or not they are offenses, may or do jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or of 
persons or property therein or which jeopardize good order and discipline on board).  Article 1 
of the convention includes the hijacking of aircraft registered in any of the nations that are 
parties to the convention while in flight.  Given this, if a contending nation was a party to the 
same convention, and if that nation was the victim of a hijacking incident, despite the fact that 
the crime was committed extraterritorially by non-nationals, South Korea would have jurisdiction 
over the perpetrators, and would be able to prosecute and penalize them.  In other words, Article 
3 of the Law concerning the Operational Safety of Aircraft provides for penalties based on the 
cosmopolitan principle in relation to hijackings.  This runs counter to the nation’s normal 
legislative stance.
 Because, as indicated above, South Korea is a party to international conventions related to 
hijackings, has established a law concerning aircraft safety, and has provided for penalties based 
on the cosmopolitan principle, virtually no irresolvable legal problems arise between the nation 
and the other parties to the convention in the matter of terrorist hijacking incidents.  However, 
with regard to other forms of international terrorism, the nation is not a member of the relevant 
international conventions, and has not stipulated penalties based on the cosmopolitan principle. 
In the event that a non-national committed a terrorist act other than a hijacking overseas and 
subsequently fled to South Korea, it would be difficult for the nation to prosecute and penalize 
that individual under its domestic legal procedures.  In this case, there would be extradition 
problems.  At the same time, if South Korea had not concluded an extradition convention with 
the nation of jurisdiction, it would be difficult to extradite the offender.  This raises fears that 
South Korea will be used as a refuge for terrorists, and the necessity for domestic legislative 
measures that will prevent this has been pointed out12.
12　 Son, “Miguk tongsidabalt’erŏ ihu, chuyogukkaŭi taet’erŏ ippŏbe kwanhan koch’al.” 109-110.
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( 5 )　Issues in the establishment of domestic laws
 Giving consideration to the stipulations of the four international conventions related to the 
regulation of terrorism (the Rome Convention, the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf, the Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, and the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism) which, unlike the others, South Korea had still not become a party to by 
2003, when the majority of other nations had joined international terrorism-related conventions 
in the wake of the 9.11 attacks, we find that prior to the nation’s accession to the conventions 
there were cases in which acts that constituted crimes under the terms of the conventions did not 
constitute crimes under the terms of South Korean domestic law.  In other words, in order to 
accede to these conventions, it was first necessary for the nation to rapidly correct the lacunae 
in its domestic law in terms of stipulation of penalties.
 First, Article 3(1) of the Rome Convention defines the endangerment of the safe navigation 
of a ship through the communication of information known to be false as constituting an offense. 
However, because South Korea’s Penal Code and Special Law incorporated no penalties for the 
communication of false information, separate legislative measures were required.  The Law 
concerning the Safety of Shipping was accordingly revised13.
 Second, Article 2 of the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings defines the 
following acts as constituting offenses: The delivery, placement, discharge or detonation of an 
explosive or other lethal device in a public place with the intention of causing 1) Death; 2) 
Serious injury; 3) Major economic loss; 4) Attempting to commit such an offense or participating 
as an accomplice in such an offense; and 5) Contributing to a terrorist group that commits such 
an offense.  However, the penalties stipulated in Article 119 (concerning the use of explosives) 
and Article 172 (concerning the detonation of explosive substances) of South Korea’s existing 
Penal Code did not cover all of the acts specified by the convention.  In particular, no penalties 
were stipulated for the delivery of disease-causing agents or biological toxins or for the attempted 
destruction of facilities.  With regard to penalties for contributing to terrorist groups, some of the 
terms of the convention exceeded the scope of interpretation of stipulations regarding complicity 
in South Korea’s Penal Code.  Consequently, it was necessary to establish penalties in the Penal 
Code by means of separate legislative measures.  Provisions concerning the use of explosives 
were revised in Articles 119-121, and provisions concerning the detonation of explosive 
substances were revised in Article 172.  The government expressed the intention of establishing 
severe penalties, and for the use of explosives applied the death penalty, or penalties of life 
imprisonment or imprisonment for seven years or more to acts causing death, injury or damage 
to property and to acts threatening public safety (including attempted offenses).
 Third, South Korea’s domestic law contained a number of lacunae in relation to the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.  First, Article 2 of 
13　 The revision was made to Article 1(5), concerning the relationship between the Law concerning the 
Safety of Shipping (Law 8221; revised January 3, 2007) and international conventions.  “In the event that 
the provisions of this law differ from the standards for safety established by international conventions 
concerning the safety of ships and their passengers engaged in international navigation, the provisions of 
the relevant international convention will take precedence.  However, this will not apply when the 
provisions of this law are more stringent than the standards established by international conventions.”
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the convention defines the provision or collection of funds for use in terrorist acts, the attempt 
to commit an act of the type discussed above or participation in such an act, or contribution to 
the commission of an act of the type discussed above by a terrorist group as offenses.  However, 
these acts were judged as not forming part of the category of serious offenses to which the 
relevant South Korean laws, the Law concerning the Reporting, Use, etc. of Information 
concerning Specified Financial Transactions and the Law for the Regulation, Punishment, etc. 
of Concealment of Unlawful Profits, were applicable14, and some of the stipulations of the 
convention regarding the provision of support for terrorist organizations exceeded the scope of 
interpretation of the stipulations of South Korea’s Penal Code concerning complicity15.  In 
addition, because the purpose of the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism was to cut off the supply of funds in advance, conflicts arose between 
the provisions of the convention and the Law concerning the Reporting, Use, etc. of Information 
concerning Specified Financial Transactions and the Law for the Regulation, Punishment, etc. 
of Concealment of Unlawful Profits, put into effect in South Korea on November 28, 2001, the 
purpose of which was to prevent future money laundering16.  This fact necessitated the revision 
of related laws to make it possible to track and circulate information regarding terrorist financing 
and to cut off such financing17.
14　 Article 2 of the Law for the Regulation, Punishment, etc. of Concealment of Unlawful Profits was 
revised as indicated below (revised March 22, 2004 and December 21, 2007).  The definition of the 
terminology employed in the law is as follows: Article 2(1) “Designated offense” refers to offenses 
specified in a separate table as being committed for the purpose of unlawfully obtaining financial gain 
(“Serious crimes” below) and, as specified by Article 2(2):2, offenses stipulated by 1) the Law concerning 
Penalties for Procurement of Sexual Services, etc. (limited to the knowing provision of funds, land or 
premises to assist in the sale of sexual services), 2) Article 5(2) and Article 6 (restricted to “Uncommitted 
crimes” in Article 5(2)) of the Law concerning Penalties for Acts of Violence, etc., 3) Article 3(1) of the 
Law for the Prevention of Bribery of Foreign Civil Servants in International Business Transactions, 4) 
Article 4 of the Law concerning the Application of More Severe Penalties, etc. in the Case of Specific 
Economic Crimes, and Articles 8 to 16 of the Law concerning Penalties, etc. for Crimes under the 
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.
15　 The Law concerning the Prohibition of Obtaining Funds for the Purpose of Threatening the General 
Public, etc. (Law No. 8697; formulated December 21, 2007; entered into force December 22, 2008) can be 
offered as a concrete example.  Under the terms of this law, individuals, corporate entities or groups 
judged as being involved in the procuring of funds through menaces may be publicly identified as such 
and have restrictions placed on their financial transactions, and criminal penalties are applied to 
individuals soliciting or supplying funds (Article 2(1), Article 4, Article 6).
16　 Seung, Nak-In, “Jakŭm set’ak Pangjipŏpjeron” [A Legal Discussion of Preventing Money Laundering], 
(Seoul: Kyŏngin Munhwa Publishing, 2007).
17　 Revisions were made, first, to Article 4, concerning the reporting of suspicious transactions in illegal 
assets, etc., Article 4(2), concerning the reporting of transactions in large sums by financial institutions, 
etc., Article 5(2),concerning the responsibility of financial institutions, etc. to identify customers, Article 
6 (revised December 21, 2007), concerning the publication of materials, etc. concerning foreign exchange 
transactions, Article 7 (revised January 17, 2005, December 21, 2007, and February 29, 2008), concerning 
the provision of information to investigative agencies, etc., and Article 11 (revised January 17, 2005), 
concerning the supervision and prosecution of financial institutions, etc., of the Law concerning the 
Reporting, Use, etc. of Information concerning Specified Financial Transactions (Law No. 8863; partially 
revised February 29, 2008).  Next, revisions were made to Article 8 (revised March 31, 2005), concerning 
the seizure of profits from crimes, etc., Article 10, concerning taxes in arrears, and Article 11 (revised 
December 19, 2008), concerning the provision of international assistance, of the Law for the Regulation, 
Punishment, etc. of Concealment of Unlawful Profits (Law No. 9141; partially revised December 19, 
2008; entered into force March 20, 2009).
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 In addition, Article 8 of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism stipulates the identification, detection, freezing or seizure of funds allocated for the 
purpose of committing terrorist offenses and the seizure of any proceeds derived from such 
offenses, and Article 18 stipulates that parties to the convention shall take the necessary measures 
in their domestic legislation to prevent the offenses defined in Article 2.  However, the legal 
basis for the identification of financial transactions presumed to be related to terrorism and the 
presentation of that information to foreign governments was lacking in the relevant legislation 
in South Korea.  For example, Article 4 of the Law concerning the Use of Real Names and the 
Preservation of Confidentiality in Financial Transactions prohibits on principle the 
communication of information regarding financial transactions without the agreement of the 
individual in whose name the transactions were undertaken, and stipulates only six exceptions, 
including the issuance of a warrant by a court of law.  The necessity of appropriately revising 
the law to enable terrorist funding to be tracked had therefore increased.  Related to this, on 
March 22, 2002, the UN judged a report submitted by South Korea concerning its anti-terrorist 
activities to be insufficient based on UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (September 28, 
2001), and requested a follow-up report18.  The follow-up report was to contain details of legal 
provisions and procedures for the monitoring of suspicious financial transactions, due diligence 
with respect to reports from financial institutions, etc. regarding terrorist funding, and specific 
legal provisions for the suspension of terrorist funding.  South Korea revised the pertaining 
legislation, the Law concerning the Use of Real Names and the Preservation of Confidentiality 
in Financial Transactions, in order to satisfy the standards required by the UN19.
 However, even if South Korea was able to solve these issues and become a party to all of 
the international terrorism-related conventions, many problems would still confront the nation 
in regard to the prevention of terrorism, the application of penalties to terrorists, and the 
extradition of terrorists.  In the case of the trial conducted over the Korean Airlines bombing 
incident in 1987, the perpetrator Kim Hyon-hui was first arraigned on March 7, 1989 and, 
despite appeals, the death sentence was handed down in 1990.  Kim, however, was subject to a 
special pardon from the South Korean President due to the fact that she was the sole living 
witness to the events and would stand as living testimony to North Korea’s aggressiveness and 
its acts of encroachment on its neighbor.  The possibility cannot be denied that serious problems 
will be caused in future by such arbitrary decisions on the scope of political crimes.  From this 
perspective, we may point to the necessity of modifying the system of international conventions 
itself.  We must formulate a comprehensive convention for the prevention of terrorism that 
incorporates clear definitions and resolves ambiguities; the necessity for South Korea to join 
such a convention and modify its domestic laws in accord with it will only increase in future.
18　 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1373, 2001.
19　 Revisions were made to Article 3 (revised March 30, 2002 and February 29, 2008), concerning the 
conducting of financial transactions under real names, Article 4 (revised March 30, 2002, March 24, 
2006, August 3, 2007, and February 29, 2008), concerning the guarantee of confidentiality in financial 
transactions, Article 4(2) (Revised March 24, 2006), concerning reporting of the status of provision of 
information regarding financial transactions, etc., and Article 4(3) (revised March 24, 2006 and February 
29, 2008), concerning the recording and management of information regarding financial transactions, 
etc., of the Law concerning the Use of Real Names and the Preservation of Confidentiality in Financial 
Transactions (Law No. 9324; partially revised December 31, 2008).
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Ⅵ.　Conclusion
 A consideration of South Korea’s domestic laws related to international terrorism clearly 
reveals problems related to definitions of terrorism, including difficulties in relation to the 
identification of a terrorist or a political offense, and problems inherent to the individually 
adopted international terrorism-related conventions, as for example in cases in which either 
South Korea or a nation with which it was involved was not yet a party to a convention.
 In addition, given that South Korea has frequently experienced acts of terrorism at the 
hands of North Korean agents, and is situated in a political environment that necessitates the 
continuation of national service even today, the introduction of powerful regulations concerning 
the monitoring of information and a legal system that enables flexible political responses are 
desirable trends.  The growing international opposition to terrorism since the 9.11 attacks has 
provided further impetus to these trends.  However, the danger that domestic legal systems will 
be too quickly modified in response to a temporary international consensus is high.  This is the 
very reason why it is necessary for domestic law to move in parallel with international law. 
Naturally, this mode of procedure does not imply a lack of action in response to the North 
Korean system.  The point that must be taken into consideration in this regard is the increased 
resolve expressed by North Korea since 9.11 to participate in the system of international 
terrorism-related conventions.  The application of specific restrictions to North Korea’s domestic 
laws through the acceleration of this tendency and the movement of the nation towards accession 
to international conventions surely hold the possibility of shifting the situation to a more peaceful 
footing.
 To date, insufficient points of connection have been established between discussions of 
international terrorism-related conventions and discussions of domestic law.  However, given 
the advancement of globalization and the increasing danger that any individual might become a 
victim of international terrorism, it is essential that we keep both within focus simultaneously. 
The conventions that have been adopted amid the welter of international argumentation reflect 
increasing international cognizance of human rights, the sophisticated awareness of terrorists 
themselves, and a stance of working to bring terrorist crimes to justice.  I believe that South 
Korea’s supplementation of its domestic laws in line with these conventions will not only benefit 
anti-terrorist measures, but will have a beneficial influence on the nation’s system of domestic 
law in its entirety.
